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Critical upward communication improves decision making in organisations. Without it, 
senior management teams become out of touch with the mood of their people, and 
underestimate or miss emerging problems in their marketplace. They are more likely to 
produce strategies that are misaligned with the perceptions of their employees. The 
possibility of successful strategic implementation is therefore dramatically reduced. 
This suggests that two way communication and critical feedback is vital to 
organisational success. The problem is that most of us are suspicious of any feedback to 
the effect that our behaviour, decisions or most cherished beliefs are in error. We react 
instinctively against it – what has been called the automatic vigilance effect. Moreover, 
most of us are also reluctant to transmit critical information, recognising that the hostile 
reaction of recipients may endanger our standing in their eyes, and possibly damage our 
careers. We therefore exaggerate how much we agree with the opinions of people who 
have a higher status than us – the ingratiation effect. This causes managers to form 
inaccurate impressions of the climate within their organisations, with dangerous 
strategic consequences. This article explores the problems that these dynamics create 
for companies. It examines the benefits that can be obtained from institutionalising 
more critical upward feedback into an organisation’s communication systems. I 
propose ‘ten commandments’ that can help organisations to reorient themselves in this 
direction. 
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HOW SENIOR MANAGERS BECOME OUT OF TOUCH WITH THEIR 
PEOPLE 
 
The effectiveness of strategy ultimately boils down to the soundness of the vision that 
underpins it, and the willingness of employees at the coalface to implement it. 
Employee resistance can undermine the soundest vision or most logical business plan. 
But a poor vision and staff resistance forms a lethal cocktail, and results more often 
than not in organisational failure. Managers attempt to safeguard against such 
eventualities by scanning the external environment for emerging competitive threats 
and fresh business opportunities.  The strategies developed by the senior management 
team in response to such environmental stimuli will be subject to rigorous tests and 
debate as part of the formulation process. However, the view from those charged with 
implementation is often neglected1.  
 
But scanning the internal environment could give companies equally valuable 
information. Employees can provide invaluable feedback on managers’ perceptions of 
threats and opportunities, and the soundness or otherwise of plans to respond to them. It 
is self evident that, to be effective, much of this feedback needs to be critical in nature. 
No individual or group makes the right decisions all the time. But here is the paradox. 
Critical feedback may be indispensable for good decisions. Despite this, most of us 
react instinctively against it. We reject critical feedback, and then penalise dissenters 
(‘the awkward squad’), thus ensuring that we will hear less from them in the future.  
Faced with this, employees quickly realise that the best way to acquire influence and 
secure their position is to exaggerate how much they agree with the opinions of senior 
managers. Over time, more and more upward communication in companies becomes 
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flattering rather than critical in nature. This may be gratifying – and, indeed, most of us 
are more vulnerable to the seductive power of flattery than we like to think. But it poses 
a serious problem. What happens when strategies wrought by managers are seriously in 
error, as many of them inevitably are? When sufficient and timely critical feedback is 
curtailed or eliminated, managers deprive themselves of a crucial means of ascertaining 
how viable their strategies are. Flattery constitutes a perfumed trap for decision makers. 
It improves the odds of organisational failure. Consequently, it is vital that the role of 
critical upward communication becomes more recognised as an element of the strategy 
formulation process. 
 
My attention became focused on this problem in the course of conducting assessments 
of communication practices and climate in numerous companies with a number of 
colleagues2. Such exercises usually end in a formal presentation to senior managers, 
describing the good, the bad and the ugly. But I have been consistently struck by the 
following pattern. The managers concerned generally accepted positive findings 
uncritically, and indeed often claimed that they knew them already. However, they 
were frequently shocked by negative information. It appeared that the surveys we 
conducted  were often their first opportunity to find out what their people really thought 
about the organisation’s overall direction, the priorities of its senior management team, 
and their style of communication. On a day-by-day basis, systems were rarely in place 
for people to formally or informally feed this information into the decision making 
process. Even when such systems were in place, the resultant information was often 
dismissed as unimportant. Nor is this experience unique. The British TV series ‘Back to 
the Floor’ features top executives spending a week back working on the shop-floor. 
Without fail, in each programme, the person concerned is astonished by what they find. 
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Evidently, formal communication channels often filter out crucial bits of information, 
leaving those at the top more out of the loop than they had realised. 
 
Some managers took data indicating problems as an alarm call, and immediately went 
to work on action plans designed to remedy the problems. But others bitterly contested 
the findings. These managers argued that no one had ever brought such issues to their 
attention before, and that the data must therefore be flawed. Paradoxically, I have rarely 
found a mood of surprise or resistance further down the organisational hierarchy. Both 
middle managers and non-managerial employees had a keener awareness of problems 
concerning such issues as morale and communication climate. In contrast, top 
managers were much more convinced that their people were well informed on key 
corporate goals than was the case. Moreover, they often seemed more certain that 
others could openly speak their minds to them than anybody else in their organisation. 
These experiences raise important issues. 
 
My key point is that honest communication between those without managerial power 
and those with such power, particularly when it consists of openly critical feedback, is 
an important aspect of decision making – in my view, a crucial ingredient of any 
effective strategy formulation and implementation process. It is a barometer of 
organisational health. In particular, systems should be established to facilitate critical 
upward communication both when strategy is being formulated and when it is 
implemented. It is increasingly clear that strategic dialogue needs to be embedded 
throughout the organisation, with more employees taking responsibility for a wider 
range of issues. This requires a constant dialogue between managers and their people, 
and among varied work groups, about likely competitive threats and the most 
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appropriate means of dealing with them. The debate might not always be polite or 
pretty. But without it the odds on success are narrowed. 
 
Yet top managers are anxious to move rapidly into implementation. They are often 
impatient with debate: it appears to take too much time. The danger with such 
impatience is that senior managers can come up with a new direction that hasn’t been 
properly tested, refined and improved by ongoing process of challenging dialogue. It is 
also more likely to run up against uncomprehending resistance, further increasing the 
likelihood of failure. In such a context, it is scarcely surprising that so many strategic 
plans are never implemented! Thus, I argue that managers need to face up to the 
following questions: 
• How much importance do we really attach to critical feedback? A huge body of 
research suggests that decision-making improves in a climate of debate, dissent 
and discussion3. I look at some of the benefits that arise from welcoming critical 
feedback rather than suppressing it, and with which I believe managers need to 
become more familiar. 
• What are the obstacles that prevent critical feedback being articulated more 
frequently? However justified critical feedback is, most of us react instinctively 
against it. On the other hand, we also like and encourage positive feedback. 
Thus, managers often respond to critical feedback in ways that reduce and then 
eliminate it altogether, fatally distorting the communication climate within their 
organisations. In essence, they tend to have their own magic mirror, which 
reassures them that they are indeed the fairest and most effective 
communicators in the land. Drawing on the research conducted with a number 
of colleagues, I look at the communication dynamics involved in this process, 
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and which managers need to consider when addressing these problems in their 
own company. 
• What can be done to institutionalise more critical feedback into management 
communication systems? Action to address this problem can take place at group 
and individual levels. I propose ‘Ten Commandments’ that equip managers with 
a greater range of options for dealing with this problem. 
 
THE BENEFITS OF DISSENT AND UPWARD FEEDBACK 
 
Over the past five decades, there has been a growing trend towards more participative 
working relationships and practices. Communication is consistently recognised as an 
integral part of participative processes, and its role in these has been widely studied4. 
But most corporate organizations have remained largely autocratic in form. In 
particular, the need for upward communication that is critical of organisational goals 
and management performance has been little recognised by management practitioners. 
Paradoxically, it has long been known that feedback is essential to effective human 
performance in any task. The more channels of accurate and helpful feedback we have 
access to, the better we are likely to perform. Most companies recognise the importance 
of obtaining feedback from key markets to assess how their products are being 
received. They pay particular attention to data indicating problems with product quality 
or an ebbing of customer confidence. But, in relation to staff communications, many 
appear to take the view that feedback is only required from the top down. Such a 
perspective is consistent with the bias in the literature on both strategic management 
and transformational leadership which emphasises change as a top down process. 
Influence is generally conceived as something that flows from those with power to 
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those without, rather than the other way round. A double standard is evident. Senior 
managers set a strategic direction, but do so after a robust process of discussion and 
debate. Typically, employees are usually denied similar opportunities – their role is to 
act as the enthusiastic cheer leaders for decisions already made. They are nevertheless 
expected to display an understanding, commitment and engagement to strategies 
similar to that of managers – but without the benefit of a comparable process of debate, 
dissent and dialogue. This puts them in a position where they lack not only ownership 
of the organisation’s strategic direction, but also the information required to align their 
behaviours with it. In turn, the ‘lack of honest upward communication from lower 
levels (makes) it impossible for the senior team to learn about the limitations of their 
mental models and the capabilities needed to accomplish strategic objectives5.’ No 
wonder that these latter authors have identified the lack of adequate upward 
communication as one of the ‘silent killers’ of organisational strategy, contributing as it 
does to an inadequate alignment in goals and purpose between many of the key people 
who are essential for competitive success. Contrary to such a situation, the weight of 
the research evidence suggests that, where they exist, upward feedback, upward 
communication and open door policies deliver significant organisational benefits. This 
evidence is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Such findings are consistent with the view that organisations are best viewed as 
information processing entities6. From this standpoint, research has long suggested that 
people are more likely to be committed to a course of action if they are involved in the 
decision making process that gives rise to it. The articulation of employee voice is 
therefore a vital, if often under realised, ingredient of efforts at empowerment and 
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involvement7. In this context, communication can be viewed as a step on the escalator 
of participation. People cannot be viewed merely conduits for information. They are 
active, and questioning, agents in the process of decision making. What can be termed 
‘the dialogic organisation’ seeks to institutionalise many forms of employee voice, 
including dissent, into the strategy making process, and embeds strategic dialogue 
throughout the organisation. 
 
As uncertainty and complexity increase it is likely that the need for information 
processing will grow. An upward flow of information is therefore likely to become an 
increasingly important issue. Yet it is also clear that a smooth flow of critical upward 
communication does not always occur. As two leading researchers have cogently 
argued8:  
‘Not only do managers often prefer to hear good news but, in fact, subordinates often 
get promoted up the career ladder because they tell only good news. Thus, as managers 
move up in the organisation, it becomes more difficult for them to get honest feedback 
on their efforts as their subordinates are busily portraying every effort as a success.’ 
 
Paradoxically, this is more likely to undermine the status of senior managers than it is 
to strengthen their position. Research has shown that when managers openly solicit and 
accept negative feedback they gain a more accurate picture of their actual performance 
and are rated more favourably by employees. But when they look for positive feedback 
they acquire no extra insight into their true performance and are viewed less favourably 
by others9.  
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Despite this, many managers deny the existence of problems and discourage critical 
feedback. Research has suggested that, to deny fault and avert the possibility of blame, 
senior managers sometimes conceal negative organisational outcomes, suppress 
information, cover up negative financial data, deny failure, and sometimes ‘launch 
propaganda campaigns that deny the existence of crises’10. Given that they also appear 
to receive little in the way of critical upward feedback from rank and file employees, it 
is pertinent to identify the obstacles that get in the way. 
 
BARRIERS TO UPWARD FEEDBACK 
 
1. Fear of Feedback 
 
A range of considerations influence the extent to which we actively look for feedback. 
Most of us have a tendency to prefer feedback that is supportive of our behaviour, in 
both our personal and professional lives. Negative feedback can be personally upsetting 
and may also impact adversely upon one’s public image. Feedback to the effect that a 
cherished course of action is failing or lacks support is bound to be unwelcome. 
Seeking critical feedback may even be seen as denoting weakness. It isn’t surprising 
therefore that people at all organisational levels are often fearful about seeking 
feedback on their performance or on the quality of their decisions; managers are no 
different. A range of considerations influence the extent to which we actively look for 
feedback11. Some of these are listed in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
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Followers who are less compliant will be more likely to deliver upward and critical 
feedback. But many managers value compliance more than dissent, and will be more 
likely to fire dissidents than to applaud them.  As is often the case, Enron provides a 
good case example. Sherron Watkins was a senior employee who worked with the 
company’s Chief Financial Officer, Andy Fastow. When she realised that the 
company’s losses would become apparent sometime in 2003 or 2004, she drew her 
concerns to the attention of the then CEO, Ken Lay. Support was not forthcoming from 
other senior executives, who evidently feared that to acknowledge the problems would 
damage their careers. Lay’s own response suggests these fears were well founded. 
Within days of meeting with Watkins, he contacted the organization’s lawyers to 
inquire if grounds could be found for firing her. 
 
2.  Problems of Ingratiation 
 
One of the most potent explanations for difficulties with upward feedback can be found 
in ingratiation theory. This proposes that those with a lower level of status habitually 
exaggerate the extent to which they agree with the opinions and actions of higher status 
people, as a means of acquiring influence with them12. Studies indicate that decreased 
power among subordinates is accompanied by an increased tendency on their part to 
employ some form of ingratiation and an increased use of ‘politeness’ strategies13. The 
business consequences can be severe. For example, a culture of sycophancy has been 
identified as a key factor in the profits collapse that afflicted one of the UK’s best-
known retailers, Marks & Spencer, in the late 1990s14. The company chairman’s direct 
reports have confessed that they actively avoided bringing bad news to his attention, 
fearing his wrath. This meant that he lacked a full appreciation of his organisation’s 
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problems. Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair became convinced that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction, and took the country to war on the premise that 
they could be deployed against the UK within forty five minutes. Exhaustive searches 
of the country after the invasion showed that it had none. It appears that any evidence 
inconsistent with his instincts was critiqued or ignored. However, a flawed dossier 
culled from an old PhD thesis was instantly accepted, since the evidence it offered was 
consistent with the Prime Minister’s instincts. In effect, different standards of proof 
were demanded for positions, depending on how supportive or critical they were of the 
decisions preferred by those at the top. Officials involved in policy and strategy 
development learned to muffle their views. However, as De Vries15 has noted in a 
different situation: ‘Effective organisational functioning demands that people have a 
healthy disrespect for their boss, feel free to express emotions and opinions openly, and 
are comfortable engaging in banter and give and take.’  
 
In addition, self-efficacy biases suggest that most of us imagine we are better on 
various crucial dimensions of behaviour than we actually are. Accordingly, researchers 
have generally found that managers view the defective and uncritical feedback they 
receive from subordinates as accurate, sincere, and well meant – it is in line with their 
self-efficacy biases. Since they are therefore inclined to think that the inaccurate and 
ingratiating feedback they receive daily is accurate, they grow even less inclined to 
seek mechanisms that institutionalise critical upward feedback into the decision-making 
process. Both peripheral and close range vision become tainted, and lead to poor 
decisions. 
 
3. Power differentials 
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Power and status differentials fuel ingratiation practices. But they also cause people to 
censor the expression of their views more generally. Enron again serves as a good 
illustration. The company operated a system known as ‘rank and yank’, in which those 
classified as poor performers stood ultimately to lose their jobs. Given its aggressive 
recruitment practices, and the pressures of being a new employee, it appears that up to 
half the organisation’s employees were in peril of redundancy at any one time16. It is 
very unlikely that people in such a fearful state would communicate critical feedback to 
those managers with the power to ‘yank’ anyone perceived as being off-message. 
Clearly, some imbalances of power are unavoidable. But counter-balancing 
mechanisms are essential. Otherwise, the communication climate will deteriorate, and 
those at the receiving end of whatever information is transmitted will find it harder, 
through the fog, to retain a clear perception of reality. 
 
4.  Groupthink 
 
Problems with upward feedback have consistently been shown to be a key part of what 
is known as ‘groupthink’. This proposes that groups insulated from critical outside 
feedback develop illusions in their own invulnerability, excessive self-confidence in the 
quality of their decision-making and an exaggerated sense of their distinctiveness from 
other groups. Furthermore, they deny or distort facts, offer rationalisations for their 
activities, use myth and humour to exaggerate their sense of worth, and attribute the 
failure of their decisions to external factors, rather than the quality of their own 
decision making. It follows that such groups will also disparage criticism from outside 
their own ranks, since it is more likely to conflict with the group’s ideal self-image, 
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depart from its well-entrenched norms, and come from sources outside the high status 
few that belong to the inner circle of key players17. Ironically, ‘companies of all sizes 
increasingly recognise that ideas are their most precious commodity and employees 
who produce them are sought after resources.’18 But the evidence suggests that the 
welcoming embrace accorded new ideas stops short of those that are critical of 
organisational orthodoxy – an orthodoxy which may, of course, blind those concerned 
to the changes they must make to enhance their strategic position. Moreover, those 
attempting to offer feedback are more likely to respond to such a reaction by 
minimising much needed future critical feedback. In turn, this is likely to reinforce the 
conviction of those at the top that, rogue indicators aside, things are much better than 
they are, and that the group does not require additional outside input.  
 
5.  Narcissism and Group Identity 
 
Critical upward feedback is often systematically distorted, constrained and eliminated. 
When this occurs, and consistent with the data on groupthink, a narcissistic group 
identity may result, characterised by such ego-defence mechanisms as ‘denial, 
rationalisation, attributional egotism, sense of entitlement, and ego aggrandizement’19. 
People have a need to nurture a positive sense of self, and they embrace ego-defensive 
behaviour in order to maintain self-esteem. Eliminating or disparaging critical 
feedback is one obvious means of accomplishing this.  
 
I worked recently with one Senior Management Team (SMT) in the health sector who 
insisted that they wanted to empower their staff to take decisions, and free them to 
transmit upward feedback. They complained, however, that people resisted their 
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efforts to accomplish these goals, and that rather than take decision-making power 
into their hands they continued to ‘delegate it upwards.’ Moreover, narcissism implies 
a tendency to blame others for whatever problems are admitted, rather than owning 
one’s own contribution to their creation – what I would describe as a process of 
‘blame realignment’. In line with this, the SMT explained all communication 
problems as the responsibility of the next tier of general managers immediately below 
themselves. They were held to be uniformly incompetent, and failing in all aspects of 
their job. Unfortunately, close scrutiny of the SMT’s behaviour as opposed to its 
avowed intentions found that these same managers had themselves appointed this 
management layer in the previous eighteen months; that they had then eliminated two 
dissenters from the ranks of the SMT, and hence acquired a reputation for penalising 
dissent; that even their direct reports were afraid to openly express critical views; and 
that transparent mechanisms to facilitate upward communication were absent.  
 
In general, the danger is that managers deprived of sufficient critical feedback can 
develop the mindset found among those rock stars who surround themselves with a 
sycophantic entourage. A narcissistic self-image then results, in which all successes is 
credited to the wisdom of a select few and all problems are blamed on the frailties of 
others. Such managers eventually find themselves deceived by their own publicity. 
The solution requires experimentation with power sharing, and a downsizing of 
entourages. I use the word ‘experimentation’ deliberately, since it is clear that letting 
go means someone else taking many decisions which managers may still be held 
responsible for. Since all humans are fallible, the results may be occasionally 
unedifying. But most organisations have erred in precisely the opposite direction. 
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They have a long way to go before there is a realistic possibility of over-empowered 
employees running amok in the boardroom.  
 
One study of the issue which illustrates the problem particularly well involved two 
twelve-country studies on industrial democracy and a five year longitudinal 
programme across seven companies. It concludes that ‘organizational influence 
sharing appears to have made only limited progress during the past 50 years.’20 Most 
employees have no real opportunity to contribute to the operation of their workplace 
in any context broader than the execution of their own job. To avoid sharing power 
with subordinates (who they may well narcissistically regard as inadequate), 
managers tend to overstate the downsides of power-sharing. They fortify themselves 
with reservations against what are in fact advantageous courses of action. Like dieting 
and exercise, it is easier to talk about relinquishing power and control than it is to 
actually do it. Reasons to postpone action can always be manufactured. On closer 
inspection, most of them turn out to be excuses. In reality, context is everything. 
Opportunities to share power exist, and should be more thoroughly exploited by 
managers seeking to make a genuine difference. 
 
6. How managers exaggerate the frequency of critical feedback 
 
Managers have a fundamental need to make sense of the business word around them, 
and indeed spend a great deal of time constructing plausible sounding narratives to 
achieve this end. However, the process is fraught with error. In particular, sense 
making is often driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. Here, I would suggest that 
irrational belief systems and naïve story construction ensures that managers often 
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have an imbalanced view of the communication climate in their companies, an 
exaggerated impression of how much upward feedback they receive and an 
insufficient awareness of the need for more robust systems to facilitate employee 
communications. 
 
Irrational beliefs are unfounded assumptions about the nature of the physical and 
social world. In particular, it appears that unusual events stand out in our minds, and 
in the process of retelling, acquire an added vividness. Even though the event was 
actually atypical, perversely, those involved in the discourse gradually become 
convinced that what they are describing is more typical of the category than is 
actually the case.  This is a good illustration of what has been termed the availability 
error – information that is more readily available to us (such as an unusual event) 
influences our perceptions much more than information that is harder to access. The 
effect, however, is that implausible stories become widely circulated, correspondingly 
more available to our minds and hence deeply believed21. 
 
Thus, on the relatively rare occasions when managers do receive critical upward 
feedback they experience it as a striking and hence memorable event. They are likely 
to pay it special attention. This ensures that it remains vividly in their memory, and 
hence convinces them that it is more typical an event than is actually the case. Thus, 
one research project found that positive upward feedback is a more common 
occurrence than negative upward feedback22. However, this study also showed that 
the managers concerned perceived many more instances of negative feedback than 
their subordinates. But both managers and subordinates perceived the same frequency 
of positive feedback. In essence, each instance of negative feedback acquired a 
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heightened sense of vividness for its recipient. Managers then assumed that their 
heightened awareness of the event rendered it more typical of the feedback category 
than was the case. Hence, they are less likely to appreciate the need for more of it. 
 
7.  Over-critique of Negative Feedback 
How top managers respond to critical feedback largely determines how much of it 
they will receive in the future. For most of us, critical feedback is less accepted and is 
perceived as less accurate than positive feedback. People are especially sensitive to 
negative input – what has been termed the automatic vigilance effect23. In general, it 
generates an angry response. This can be easily tested. Try telling friends that their 
new dress, suit or hairstyle is a disastrous mistake, and then calculate the ratio of 
welcoming and outraged responses that you receive. In the work context, intentionally 
or otherwise, it is clear that the generally less than enthusiastic response of managers 
to critical feedback discourages it. When this happens, the opportunity to grapple with 
problems recedes ever further into the mist. 
 
I offer an example here from the health sector SMT discussed earlier. During 
feedback to the team, some mildly critical data was reported which indicated lower-
than-ideal levels of staff trust in information received from senior managers. A 
number of positive issues were also highlighted, including trusting relationships 
between lower level managers and their direct immediate subordinates. 
 
 The SMT responded in two markedly different ways. Firstly, they enthusiastically 
accepted the data indicating strengths in the communication climate. But they rejected 
outright any feedback that implied weaknesses in their performance, although it was 
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derived from the same methods. Moreover, they invited a trained statistician to 
interrogate the data, with a view to exposing its shortcomings. In meetings on the 
issue, their efforts were completely devoted to rejecting critical data, rather than 
developing an action plan to address the problems it illuminated. In short, the data 
were simultaneously regarded as prescient – but fatally flawed. The process suggests 
that top managers have a tendency to over-critique negative feedback, while instantly 
agreeing with positive feedback.  
 
Two results are likely to flow from this. Firstly, most people at the receiving end of 
such a response will minimise further efforts at conveying what they really feel. The 
organisational climate is perceived as punitive. Employees crouch in their trenches, 
rather than engage with each other or managers. In essence, this suggests that senior 
managers engage too readily in a process of unconscious feedback distortion. For 
example, it has been found that some subordinates who had experienced extremely 
negative emotional encounters with their supervisors edited their communication to 
make it more formal, superficial, task-oriented and devoid of personal messages (e.g. 
self disclosures)24. Thus, motivating truthful upward communication is widely 
recognised as a serious problem.  
 
Secondly, when senior managers put themselves in the position of encouraging only 
the feedback that they like and penalising that which they dislike, they acquire an 
imbalanced view of the climate in their own companies. I suspect that this dynamic 
underlies a problem I have often encountered – the tendency for senior managers to be 
the only ones surprised by data offering a critical diagnosis of the communication 
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climate in their companies. The challenge, clearly, is to adopt an equally rigorous 
approach to both positive and negative feedback. 
 
8. Characteristics of Top Teams and Communication Networks 
 
Top teams are responsible for setting strategic direction, and communicating it widely 
among teams, team members and other emergent communication networks. But as 
organisations grow larger, so do distances between team members, between teams, 
and between teams and senior managers. Meanwhile, the importance of strategic 
alliances and inter-organisational collaborations has grown in recent decades, 
rendering communication networks more important than ever.  
 
However, there is an obvious problem with the emergence of rich communication 
networks. The ‘law of N-squared’ proposes that with more and more people in a given 
organisation the number of potential links in a network organisation increases 
geometrically, and soon exceeds everyone’s capacity for communicative action25. The 
law of propinquity also recognises that the probability of two people communicating 
is inversely proportional to the distance between them. The number of communication 
options, as well as obligations, combined with such prosaic matters as physical 
distance renders contact between senior managers and those further down the 
hierarchy increasingly elusive. Although initiatives can be taken to compensate for 
these difficulties (including the use of e-communications), it is unlikely that much 
will happen if senior managers themselves do not recognise the absence of upward 
communication as a problem. 
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9. Autocratic Models of Leadership 
 
Research has long shown that new group members, or those with low status, initially 
acquire influence within a group by over-conforming to its emergent norms26 - i.e. in 
order not to offend key players, they minimise the amount of critical feedback that they 
are prepared to offer. If they are perceived not to be ‘fitting in’, they are penalised, 
usually through the withdrawal of valued social rewards. I recently worked in one 
company that exemplified the resultant mindset. Employees reported the existence of 
an unofficial culture which revolved around the motion that people were expected to 
‘fit in, or f*** off.’  
 
Such over-conformity means that followers comply with destructive forms of action, in 
order to ingratiate themselves with their leaders. In fact, it puts leaders at risk. The 
leader takes the absence of overt dissent as assent, and moreover views it as 
supplementary evidence that the given course of action is correct – what has been 
termed consensual validation. The leader marches into battle, armoured by his or her 
greater status, authority and power. They fail to realise that the structure which gives 
them these advantages also deprives them of critical reaction from followers, thus 
leaving the leader fatally out of touch with reality and bereft of sufficient followers on 
the battle field. Thus, the most successful leaders are liable to be those with the least 
compliant followers, ‘for when leaders err – and they always do – the leader with 
compliant followers will fail27..’ 
 
Yet many managers view resistance as something to be overcome, rather than as useful 
feedback. This problem is inherent to myths of heroic leadership.  Managers influenced 
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by such myths often think of influence in unidirectional terms – as something that flows 
from leaders to subordinates, rather than vice-versa. And, in fact, research does suggest 
that most feedback comes from persons in authority to their subordinates.  In this 
environment, it is easy for managers to conclude that the ideal state for their 
organisation is one of monoculturism28. Difference, dissent, debate and critical 
feedback are then banished to the margins of the group’s tightly policed norms. This is 
accomplished through the imposition of both formal and informal sanctions. Thus, it 
has long been known that in a coercive environment, instead of facilitating dissent, 
‘tremendous overt and covert pressure is brought to bear on everyone to conform 
publicly, to participate actively, and to work hard, while a façade is maintained that 
such conformity and dedication is entirely voluntary or the product of successful 
ideological persuasion’ 29. 
 
The consequences of such defects are clear. They include the elimination of dissent, an 
insufficient flow of critical upward communication, the accumulation of power at the 
centre, a failure to sufficiently consider alternative sources of action, and a growing 
belief on the leader’s part that s/he is indispensable for the organisation’s success. 
 
TEN COMMANDEMENTS FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL UPWARD 
COMMUNICATION 
 
I have argued here that critical upward feedback improves the quality of an 
organisation’s decisions, and is therefore a vital aspect of improved strategic planning 
and implementation. But I have also pointed to some of the ways in such feedback is 
eliminated or distorted. Companies affected will be less likely to reach good decisions 
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in the first place, or address emerging problems before they become Enron level 
catastrophes.  
 
The question is: what can be done to stimulate more critical upward communication 
and reduce ingratiation, groupthink and the other problems that get in the way? There is 
no ‘magic bullet’ on this issue, and no substitute for a patient and persistent approach. 
Moreover, whatever we do, some status and power differentials are bound to remain. 
However, their negative impact can at least be minimised. With those caveats, the 
following ‘ten commandments’ may form a modest starting point. While not written in 
stone, and inevitably having less authority than a Biblical edict, they are summarised in 
Table 4, and discussed in detail below: 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
1. Experiment with both upward and 360-degree appraisal. Such practices are no 
longer regarded as revolutionary, and are commonly employed in many leading 
corporations, including AT&T, the Bank of America, Caterpillar, GTE and General 
Electric. They are a powerful means of institutionalising feedback. Moreover, there is 
growing evidence to suggest that they genuinely stimulate more focused self-
development activities30. It is of course vital that the underlying organisational culture 
is genuinely supportive, and that the feedback obtained is utilised to shape changes in 
behaviour. Otherwise, both sides grow discouraged and give up on their relationship. 
Disappointment is more likely to occur when such efforts are freighted with over-
optimistic expectations, and the need to transform the wider organisational culture is 
not recognised. But, implemented with a realistic grasp of what can be achieved and a 
determination to tackle whatever obstacles arise, both upward and 360-degree appraisal 
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can make a major contribution to the creation of a more open and honest 
communication climate. 
2.  Managers should familiarise themselves with the basics of ingratiation theory. I 
have found that most top teams readily accept the notion of ingratiation. During 
workshops, many have swapped amusing anecdotes that vividly describe the process in 
action. But, in line with the great deal that is now known of self-efficacy biases, they 
then mostly go on to assume that they themselves are immune to its effects.  In reality, 
they almost never are. Senior managers, in particular, should recognise that they will be 
on the receiving end of too much feedback that is positive and too little that is critical, 
whatever their intentions. Moreover, they are just as susceptible to the effects of 
ingratiating behaviours as anyone else. While increased awareness never solves a 
problem by itself, it is an essential first step. Managers at all levels need to become 
more aware of ingratiation dynamics, of their own susceptibility to its effects and of the 
most effective responses to adopt in dealing with it. Such awareness forms part of the 
ABC of emotional literacy. Managers without it risk building catastrophically 
imbalanced relationships with their people. 
3.  Positive feedback should be subject to the same, or greater scrutiny, than negative 
feedback. Otherwise, positive feedback will come to predominate, managers will give it 
undue attention, and they will then go on to develop a dangerously rose-tinted view of 
the climate within their own organisations. In turn, this means that key problems 
remain off the agenda, and will therefore grow worse. Managers should adopt a 
thoroughly questioning attitude to all feedback from those with a lower status, and treat 
feedback that is unremittingly positive in tone with considerable scepticism. Perhaps 
Jonathan Swift, author of Gulliver’s Travels, offered the most instructive advice on 
how to react: ‘The only benefit of flattery is that by hearing what we are not, we may be 
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instructed what we ought to be.’ Management meetings should combat the tendency to 
bask in positive feedback, and instead focus on a regular agenda of questions such as 
the following: 
• What problems have come to our attention recently? 
• What criticisms have we received about the decisions we are taking?  
• Are the criticisms valid, partially or completely? What should we change in 
response to them? 
• How can we get more critical feedback into our decision-making processes? 
As in all things, balance is critical. A focus only on critical feedback would be as 
detrimental as its opposite, even though, in the present climate, there is little danger of 
this occurring. That is not the intention here. Rather, the suggestion is that both positive 
and critical feedback should be probed to ascertain how accurate it is. In particular, the 
motivation of the person or persons engaged in flattery should be considered. Flattery is 
best thought of as a non-monetary bribe. It preys on similar weaknesses. Managers 
should therefore ask themselves: what does this person have to gain by flattering me? 
And what they have to lose by disagreeing with me? 
4. Managers should seek out opportunities for regular formal and informal 
contact with staff at all levels. This should replace reliance on official reports, written 
communiqués or communication mediated through various management layers. 
Informal interaction is more likely to facilitate honest, two-way communication, 
provide managers with a more accurate impression of life and opinions at all levels of 
their organisation, and open up new opportunities for both managers and staff to 
influence each other. ‘Back to the Floor’ initiatives are increasingly recognised as a 
useful means of achieving this. A key focus during such contact should be the search 
for critical feedback. By contrast, Royal tours and flying visits yield nothing in the way 
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of useful feedback. There are many other means by which managers can put more 
distance between themselves and head office, and less distance between themselves and 
non-managerial employees. As a rule of thumb, the more reliant a manager is on 
official channels of communication the more likely it is that s/he will be out of touch 
with the mood of his or her people. 
5. Promote systems for greater participation in decision-making. Participation 
involves the creation of structures that empower people, and which enables them to 
collaborate in activities that go beyond the minimum co-ordination efforts characteristic 
of much work practice31. In general, people should be encouraged to take more 
decisions on their own. Open, information-based tactics are critical for success. 
Nevertheless, on this crucial issue, many communication efforts remain rudimentary. In 
working with senior managers, I have frequently been astonished by how many admit 
that their organisations do not have even a formal suggestion scheme in place. Its 
benefits have been documented over several decades. Yet a recent survey of members 
of the Institute of Management in the UK found that no more than 42% of them made 
significant use of what is an elementary practice32. As with all systems developed to 
address this issue, suggestion schemes have their limitations. In my experience, the 
biggest predictors of failure are 
• A reluctance on the part of managers to take them seriously 
• A tendency, in the face of initial setbacks or a lacklustre employee response, to 
give up rather than persevere  
• An expectation of revolutionary new employee initiatives - immediately 
• A slowness to respond to whatever ideas employees do produce, combined with 
a criticism that more hasn’t been forthcoming 
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• The absence of even minimal rewards. As an example, a large aerospace 
company with which I worked had a long-standing and modestly successful 
suggestion scheme. Suggestions implemented attracted a small cash reward. 
Senior managers decided to eliminate the reward, since ‘it is employees’ job to 
provide suggestions, and they are paid for it already.’ Employees felt that their 
input was no longer appreciated, and the flow of suggestions dried up. 
Managers, meanwhile, concluded that employees weren’t interested in ‘the 
bigger picture.’ 
 
A more systematic, creative and persistent focus on this issue is clearly required. It is 
important that employees are fully involved in such efforts, rather than simply 
presented with senior management’s vision of the systems it thinks are required to 
produce it. Lessons can be drawn from General Electric’s famous ‘Work Out’ Program, 
where ‘a series of assemblies… brought together large cross-sections of a business unit 
to identify ways to dismantle bureaucracy.’33 The program was a pivotal element in the 
company’s transformation. Its techniques could be adapted to address the feedback 
issues identified in this paper. 
6. Create ‘red flag’ mechanisms for the upward transmission of information that 
cannot be ignored. Organisations rarely fail because they have inadequate information. 
But they will fail if vital information either does not reach the top, or is ignored when it 
gets there. It is clear, for example, that the spectacular bankruptcy of Enron occurred in 
spite of the fact that many people who worked for it fully realised the weakness of its 
position and the unethical nature of its practices. Another telling aspect of the Enron 
scandal was the fact that whistle blowing occurred. Leaking problems outside the 
organisation in this manner occurs when employees feel they cannot safely transmit 
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important but critical information via conventional organisational channels. To prevent 
such a state of affairs, it is important to create the type of mechanisms proposed in this 
paper. I give one example of a communication system that achieved its aim of 
facilitating clear upward communication, and thus ensured that important information 
reached the ears or desks it need to reach, in Table 3. Such systems have been found to 
help organisations make the transition from being merely good in their field to 
achieving sustained greatness34. Organisations need to develop similar mechanisms, 
appropriate for their own circumstances, and rigorously pursue their implementation. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
7. Existing communication processes should be reviewed to ensure that they 
include requirements to produce critical feedback. With few exceptions, team briefings 
emphasise the transmission of information from the top to the bottom. This is akin to 
installing an elevator capable of travelling only in one direction - downwards. Team 
briefings should also include a specific requirement that problems and criticisms be 
reported up. Again, balance is vital. As already noted, exclusively critical feedback may 
be as damaging as exclusively positive feedback, and create a fearful climate dominated 
by the expectation of imminent catastrophe. No one can innovate, or even work with 
minimal effectiveness, if they confidently expect the imminent arrival of the four 
horsemen of the apocalypse. Nevertheless, with that proviso in mind, most 
organisations are a long way from having to worry about the risk of too much critical 
feedback disturbing the tranquillity of those in top positions.  
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Targets should be set for critical feedback, and closely monitored. A culture change is 
required. In particular, managers who tell their people ‘Don’t bring me problems, bring 
me solutions’ need to reengineer their vocabulary. They are generating blackouts rather 
than illumination. 
 
8. Train supervisors to be open, receptive and responsive to employee dissent. 
When supervisors behave in such a manner they are signalling receptiveness to entire 
workgroups. However, training in the appropriate skills is often lacking. As with many 
other vital communication skills, it is frequently just assumed that managers will have 
access to the right tool kit. This optimistic assumption is unwarranted. Even if people 
have some notion of which tools are available to them, training is required so that they 
select the right one for each task. Otherwise, those trained only in how to use a hammer 
may instinctively reach out for it, even when a screwdriver is more appropriate for the 
job in hand. The lack of appropriate communication skills on the part of top managers 
is one of the main reasons for the disconnect so frequently noted between the inspiring 
rhetoric of strategic visions and the mundane operational reality35.  
9. Power and status differentials should be eliminated or, where that is impossible, at 
least reduced. I gave the example earlier of Enron’s ‘rank and yank’ system, designed 
among other things to instil fear and uncertainty into employees. But similar 
approaches are employed in up to 20% of US companies. I believe that such appraisal 
systems give managers far too much power over employees. Open communication 
becomes virtually impossible. They should be eliminated - at warp speed. More 
broadly, status differentials can be reduced by blitzing some of the most visible 
symbols of privilege, such as reserved parking, executive dining rooms and percentage 
salary increases far in excess of those obtained by other employees. A growing body of 
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research suggests that excessive and highly visible signs of executive privilege 
undermines organisational cohesion and effectiveness. In particular, it promotes an ‘us 
versus them’ mentality rather than one of ‘us against the competition’36. The risks with 
addressing this question are few, but the potential gains are immense.  
 
10. The CEO, in particular, needs to openly model a different approach to the receipt 
of critical communication, and ensure that senior colleagues emulate this openness. 
Many studies have shown that when people are asked to gauge the efficacy of 
communication in general and the role of senior managers in particular they personalise 
the issue into the role of the CEO. My own audits of communication have also 
repeatedly found the same pattern. Organisations that take communication seriously are 
led by CEOs who take communication seriously. CEOs that are defensive, uncertain, 
closed to feedback and dismissive of contrary opinions may indeed get their way - in 
the short term. At the very least, they will be gratified by effusive public statements of 
compliance. But coerced compliance is usually combined with private defiance. 
Ultimately, it produces a fractious relationship between senior managers and their staff. 
And organisations where managers and employees are at war with each other, rather 
than the competition, cannot conquer new markets. Without a clear lead on 
communication at the level of the CEO, it is unlikely that progress on the issues 
discussed in this paper will be made. 
 
SUMMARY – IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
The issues raised in this paper are fundamental to the theory and practice of 
management. No one individual or any one group has a mastery of all the problems in 
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any company. The world is too complex. Given the constraints on the feedback they 
receive, many managers in fact have a poor grasp of their organisation’s problems. 
Winston Churchill put it well: ‘The temptation to tell a Chief in a great position the 
things he most likes to hear is one of the commonest explanations of mistaken policy. 
Thus the outlook of the leader on whose decision fateful events depend is usually far 
more sanguine than the brutal facts admit.’  
 
In managerial terms, it follows that the search for solutions to problems that are multi-
causal in nature requires creative input from people of varied managerial rank. In the 
diverse and pluralistic organisations of today, it is never possible to reach full 
agreement on important strategic issues. The only place where everyone agrees with 
everyone else on all vital issues is a cemetery. In the workplace, the inevitable debates 
and disagreements on strategy are best brought into the open, where they can be 
engaged by managers, rather than repressed, denied or ignored. The dialogic 
organisation will always be involved in discussion about strategic direction, including 
after decisions have been reached. Critical feedback, despite its frustrations, 
consistently offers fresh opportunities for evaluation. Such discussions sometimes 
expose differences that may appear insoluble. But the point is that such disagreements 
exist anyway. There seems little point in attempting to prohibit something that will 
proceed with or without the encouragement of managers. Rather, decision making and 
implementation will be improved if the inevitable debates that occur are brought into 
the open, rather than concealed from the view of senior managers.  
 
From an academic perspective, issues of voice have attracted growing interest. But 
much remains to be done. In particular, we need to know more about how both 
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managers and employees make sense of their respective communication practices, of 
the impact that such practices have on bottom line performance, and of the 
effectiveness of efforts designed to create more robust critical upward communication. 
For example, it may be that the impulse towards ingratiation and flattery is so 
pronounced that it is activated by even the slightest intrusion of status differentials in 
the workplace. However, it is unlikely that such differentials can be completely 
eliminated. It is also far from clear how organisations can balance between the need for 
involvement, discussion and critical upward communication on the one hand, and the 
more rapid decision making and strategy formulation demanded by an increasingly 
competitive global marketplace. There is much empirical and theoretical work to be 
done. 
 
But, in terms of practice, some things are already clear. Once environmental scanning 
reveals the existence of a problem or an opportunity, managers need to be able to 
engage their people in a debate on strategic direction. The design of strategies that 
will be implemented rather than ones that languish on shelves requires input from as 
wide a group of people as possible. Successful implementation requires buy in from 
all levels of the organisation. The communication lift must serve all floors. This 
means that managers must recognise the value of debate, dialogue and dissent, in all 
its inherent messiness. The difficulties in securing wide-spread involvement are 
obviously considerable. But they are challenges that must be met if an impregnable 




Table 1: The Impact and Benefits of Upward Feedback 
 
• The promotion of shared leadership, and an enhanced willingness by managers 
to act on employee suggestions  
• A greater tendency by employees to report positive changes in their managers’ 
behaviour  
• Actual rather than perceived improvements in management behaviour 
following on feedback, beyond what could be attributed to regression to the 
mean 
• A reduced gap between managers’ self-ratings and those of their subordinates 
• The creation of improved forums for obtaining information, garnering 
suggestions, defusing conflict and facilitating the expression of discontent 
• An enhancement of organisational learning 
• Better decision-making - currently, it is estimated that about half of decision in 
organisations fail, largely because of insufficient participation and a failure to 
carry out an unrestricted search for solutions 




Table 2: Feedback Considerations 
 
Reasons for Feedback-Seeking 
 
• High level of uncertainty and the desire to reduce it  
• The goal of becoming competent in a task  
• A wish to correct perceived errors in performance 
• Wanting to regulate and improve one’s performance 
 
 
Factors that Influence the Decision to Seek Feedback 
 
• The perceived credibility and expertise of the feedback source 
• Receptivity of the source – the extent to which the person is likely to be 
available, and willing, to give considered feedback  
• The importance of achieving a definite set target or goal 
• Concern about developing rather than demonstrating competence 
• Level of self-esteem – those higher in self-esteem seek more feedback 
• Performance expectations - those with high expectations seek more feedback 
• Going with the flow - if significant others are seeking feedback, the 
probability is that we will follow suit 
• Tactics – we are more likely to ask for feedback if we think our performance 
is good, as this shows us in a good light 
 
 
Potential Costs of Negative Feedback  
 
• Damage to one’s ego 
• A less positive public image in the organisation 








Table 3: Creating Systems For Information Flow That Cannot Be Ignored37 
 
One researcher interviewed engineers at Marshall Space Flight Centre in the 1960s, 
when Werner von Braun was its director. Repeatedly, people told him that the 
communication device that worked best was ‘The Monday notes.’ This referred to a 
practice that had sprung up when von Braun had asked 24 key managers across 
several units to send him a one-page memo every Monday morning, in which they 
described the preceding week’s progress and problems. Von Braun read their 
comments, initialled them, and added his own questions, suggestions and praise. The 
collected notes were then arranged in the order of the authors’ names and returned as 
a package to all contributors. Closer investigation showed that the key managers 
involved had compiled their own Monday notes by asking their direct reports for a 
‘Friday report’ about their activities. Some of them even organised meetings to gather 
the required information. Many of them also circulated von Braun’s eventual report 
back down the line. In short, a simple request had triggered a robust mechanism for 
the transmission of information, and ensured that whatever was contained in the 
Monday notes was acted upon rather than ignored. 
 
In a cautionary coda, subsequent research into NASA has suggested that many of its 
later problems, including the catastrophic Challenger and Colombia explosions, partly 
resulted from systems such as the Monday notes falling into disuse. Deprived of 
critical feedback, senior managers developed over-optimistic views of what could be 
achieved. This heightened levels of risk, with disastrous consequences. The 
organisation has still to recover. 
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Table 4: Improving Critical Upward Communication: The Ten Commandments 
1 Experiment with both upward and 360-degree appraisal.  
Can lead to further self-development, but requires patience, determination 
and a supportive atmosphere 
2 Managers should familiarise themselves with the basics of ingratiation 
theory.  
Appreciate that no-one is impervious to flattery- including/especially you! 
3 Positive feedback should be subject to the same, or greater scrutiny, 
than negative feedback.  
Seek a balance between positive and negative feedback. Instinctively 
mistrust positive feedback, and concentrate on problems and criticisms, 
their validity and solution 
4 Managers should seek out opportunities for regular formal and 
informal contact with staff at all levels.  
Seek honest, two-way communication by establishing informal contact with 
staff at all levels of your organisation 
5 Promote systems for greater participation in decision-making.  
A suggestion scheme, with worth-having rewards, should be first-base – 
something more systematic can follow 
6 Create ‘red flag’ mechanisms for the upward transmission of 
information that cannot be ignored.  
There must be some mechanism to ensure important or urgent problems are 
flagged up to the highest level. Whistle blowing is evidence of the complete 
failure of upward communication. But unless you provide channels for 
upward communication it is likely to occur – with disastrous public relations 
consequences. 
7 Existing communication processes should be reviewed to ensure that 
they include requirements to produce critical feedback.  
Communication systems should allow information to travel in both 
directions, and should enable responsive action. They should be constantly 
reviewed, to ensure that critical as well as positive feedback reaches the top. 
8 Train supervisors to be open, receptive and responsive to employee 
dissent.  
Give them the vital communication tools, encourage them to do the job and 
reward them when they do. 
9 Power and status differentials should be eliminated or, where that is 
impossible, at least reduced.  
Open upward communication cannot coexist with penal appraisal systems, 
and will be discouraged by a culture in which status differentials are overtly 
displayed. 
10 The CEO, in particular, needs to openly model a different approach to 
the receipt of critical communication, and ensure that senior colleagues 
emulate this openness. 
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